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One of the contested issues in this debate relates to similarities and differences
between scoring systems in China and in the West – how unique is China? In
this post, we will try to reconcile the different perspectives, arguing that both
commonalities and differences exist, depending on the adopted level of abstraction.
Thus, we shall zoom in the Chines Social Credit System (SCS), examining the
features it shares with other systems and point to related issues: it is a scoring
system, it is formal, it is ICT based, it is surveillance based, it is opaque and
unaccountable. This enables us to distinguish commonalities and differences.  
Commonalities between the Chinese SCS and other Systems
First, the Chinese SCS shares with other social rating systems the feature of
assessing people based on their skills, character, motivation, etc. Rating is in
fact a common feature of many social context, in which it contributes to people’s
reputation. For instance, in commercial relations, merchants are rated based on
their sales-volume, quality of service or reliability which determines their reputation
which is a key asset for a successful business. Workers are rated based on their
performance, attitude and motivation, and such ratings determine future employment
opportunities. University teachers are rated based on student’s assessment and
publications and papers’ citations. 
Second, the Chinese SCS shares with certain other rating systems the fact of being
institutionalised and formalised: methods and procedures are defined for recording
data and determining rankings, which have to be expressed in predefined formats.
Some formal scoring systems also share with the Chinese SCS the synthetic
expression of rankings through numeric values or positions in predefined scales (for
instance, this traditionally applies to students’ achievements). This enhances the
possibility of assessing and comparing individuals; each is labelled through his/her
reputational values, which can be used across different contexts and through time
and have persistent objectivity. Numeric values or positions in predefined scales
are common to a number of systems, from archives of criminal records to credit
recordings, managed both by humans and by automated ones.
Third, China’s SCS is ICT-based. ICT-based scoring systems present peculiar
features. They enable scores to be grounded on massive sets of data and be
obtained by any kind of complex computations. In modern societies, ICT-based
scoring systems have been used in various domains: for ranking job applicants,
assigning credit scores, assessing risks of recidivism, etc. Ratings based on ICT
tend to present common aspects: they persist in time, have an apparent degree
of objectivity, can be accessed and communicate at a distance, and can trigger
computations.
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Fourth, China’s SCS shares with other recently-developed scoring systems —such
as the fact of being not only ICT-based, but also surveillance based. As activities
and interactions become computer-mediated, observable sources of information
can be stored, merged, and intelligently processed to assess individuals according
to past behaviour and anticipate and direct future actions. The collection of useful
information is increased by the extraction of data from the physical world through
ubiquitous sensors (e.g., cameras, geolocation trackers, and face recognition). This
leads to scoring systems whose functioning is based on the massive collection of
personal data, automatically collected, and processed through AI technologies.
Consider for instance how users and workers are surveyed and scored in services
such as eBay, Uber and Airbnb.
Peculiarities of the Chinese SCS
After presenting the commonalities between the Chinese SCS and other SCSs, we
now address its peculiarities.
A first distinctive feature of the Chinese Social Credit system, as compared to
scoring systems in the West, is that the government drives it, rather than private
actors. On the contrary, the leading surveillance paradigm in the West is represented
indeed by private actors, acting for profit purposes, and implementing the economic
model of the so-called “surveillance capitalism”, as exemplified by the leading
internet companies, such as Google, Facebook and Amazon. These companies
assess and quantify the relevant attitudes and propensities of their users and
consumers, support various kinds of public rankings and scoring, interact with
companies providing specialised assessment and quantifications (e.g., in the credit
or insurance domain). It is true that in Western countries scoring may be used in
the public domain, e.g., assessing risks of criminal behaviour or to measure the
performance of civil servants.  Examples are predictive systems to determine the
risk of recidivism, which in turn contribute to determine sentences. Although the
“Surveillance state” exists also in the West — an example is the PRISM system set
up by the US government, which merged data collected from private companies
(such as Google, Apple, Facebook) and telecommunications. —no systems run by
government in Western countries reach the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of the
Chinese SCS.
A second distinctive feature of the Chinese SCS, which is linked to, and enabled by,
the first one, is the fact that this system provides for a single score based on data
covering all aspects of personality. The Chinese SCS aggregates data coming from
different data platforms and collected by various private and public stakeholders
into a centralised data infrastructure, expanding the traditional commercial rating
into financial, political, judicial, and social domains. This is an important difference
from the West, where surveillance systems and the corresponding scoring models
look at citizens as “individuals”, i.e., each system focusing on a particular face of
a person (e.g., as consumer, debtor, gamer, worker, insured, patient, doctor, etc.)
and ranking individuals with regard to aspects pertinent to that faces. Thus, it seems
that a fragmented evaluation should have a lower impact on self-esteem and social
ranking since each individual can distinguish his or her identity from each sectorial
scoring, the impact of each being is to the corresponding context.
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A third distinctive feature consists in the fact that the Chinese SCS aims to assess
the moral and civic merit of citizens and provide corresponding punishments and
rewards. On the contrary, Western systems tend to focus on aspects related to
economic performance, or risk of illegal behaviour. The single score provided by
the system tends to become an indicator of each person’s social value and can
trigger effects pertaining to all aspects of individual’s life: from work opportunities, to
access to transport, and up to health care. In such a context, individuals may react
to the fact of being surveyed and scored by adapting their behaviour to the system’s
rules, namely acting in order to avoid sanctions and gaining rewards. This may
substitute and crowd out authentic moral/legal experience, reasoning and choice,
which requires the individual to address the conflict between self-interest and moral/
legal requirements. In a Kantian spirit, we may say that the exercise of morality
requires the possibility of immortality, which is somehow excluded by pervasive
scoring, even when scores are effectively linked to pro-social behaviour (which
may not always be the case given economic and political imperatives). Reijers also
argues that scoring may induce conformity rather than distinction and creativity.
The extent to which it is true depends on the scoring methods: if scores are based
on scalable factors (e.g., school results, response time, users’ ratings), they may
incentivise excellence, though according to established criteria. On the other hand,
scoring leads to comparisons, competition, stress, possibly to social action problems,
where each individual invests too much to get a higher rank than others (e.g., in
school or work effort, in cleanness). Since not everybody can excel, some will fall
behind, which may lead to specific negative outcomes, such as dismissal or missed
opportunities, and the loss of self-esteem and marginalisation. The difficulty of
improving a score (of rehabilitation or redemption) may lead to disinvestment and
renunciation. The impact of scoring on individual motivation, while not been limited to
the Chinese SCS, is brought to the extreme by its operation.
A fourth distinctive feature of the Chinese SCS is that it has been designed and
implemented by an authoritarian government. Though the Chinese SCS has been
presented as an implementation of a model of social virtue, inspired by the Chinese
Confucian traditions, there is no warranty that it is not driven by goals of political
control and exploitation. There is no institutional mechanism that may ensure that the
rankings correspond to an acceptable notion of civic virtue. The centralisation of data
collection and scoring infrastructure rules out any direct influence by civil society, the
absence of which enhances the information asymmetry between those holding data
and individuals; on the other hand, it diminishes the possibility of citizens to hold the
political power accountable through a counter-surveillance mechanism, for instance,
through licensing and audit requirements.
China’s SCS, while presenting many commonalities with other scoring systems, is
characterised by a cluster of features – often extreme versions of general trends –
that make it both unique and exemplary.
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